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Canada provides a major part of the additional volumes required by the huge 
American gas market. With a rather high reserves-production ratio, Canadian gus production 
will face no major technical consrraints until the end of the century. However, large distonion 
due to Canadian regulatory policy and disequilibrium in the US gas market constrain suppl y 
and demand. In the first section, both volume and price historical regulation are briefly 
analyzed. Tra.ditional econometric analysis of the Nonh American gas market cannot be used 
any longer. It is necessary to explicitly take into account the fact that supply of export and 
demand for import are not necessarily equal to the physical quantities actually exchanged on 
the market. 
This paper provides in section 2 a comparison of various limited dependent 
v,uiable models to deal with this kind of particula.rity. In this way, parameters of behaviorul 
relationships of the opera.tors are identifiable. The models are intended to provide a realistic 
background in an era when markets become deregulated. Statistical aspect of the 
disequilibrium approach used in this paper has been introduced by FAIR and JAFFEE (1972) 
and developped by MADDALA and NELSON (1974). 
1. Canadian Natural Gas Regulatory Policy 
Canada has a large production potential for na.tural gas with a life index around 
1lth papcr wa~ prcscntcd al the l.A.E.E, · 131h Aru1ual. hiternational Conference, June 19 · 21.1990-Copenhagcn - r>c.nmark 
thirty. With a rather small populinion, indigeneous consumption is nor sufficient to support 
the economic exploitation of those ressources. Natural gas exports are necessary to finance 
exploration and production activities. The exports share represented around one ùlird of 
production during the 60's and 70's, to reach 40 % currently. As their only neighbor and one 
of the major gas consumers, the US is the natural client of Canada. This paramount 
importance of exports historically led Canadian authorities to regulate both quantities and 
prices on this market. The feature of this regulatory policy is not only to use ex ports as a way 
to increase domestic production profitability but also to ensure national energy requirements. 
1.1 Export Volumes Regulation 
·nie discovery of huge natural gas reserves in Western Canada during the 50's 
leads to the creation of the National Energy Board (NEB) in 1959. One of the task of this 
institution is to control the export volumes which must be a "surplus to Canadian 
requirement". To be authorized export volumes must satisfy a reserve test and a deliverability 
test. Despite those reserve fonnula, natural gas exports are almost multiply by ten during the 
60's. During the next decade, as a result of the first oil shock, the policy of the NEB became 
a real constraint for the exports (see PlJZIENE, 1986). The following table provides an 
illustration of these restrictions : 
Table 1. Canadian Gas Exports to the US 
Authorized 
MMcf Volume (1) 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1985 
804 
967 
1032 
1069 
1064 
1053 
1046 
1041 
1043 
1050 
1156 
1614 
Exported 
Volume (2) 
777 
911 
1009 
1027 
959 
948 
954 
997 
881 
1001 
796 
778 
Source: Energy lnformalion Admini.<traiion and N.EB 
% 
(2)/(1) 
97 
94 
98 
96 
90 
90 
91 
96 
84 
95 
69 
48 
At the beginning of the 80' s the NEB relax the volume constraint. However the 
exports decrease dramatically due to the "gas bubble" within the US gas market and the 
relatively low competitivity of the Canadian prices. In fact the regulatory policy in the SO's 
rely mostly on pricing policy. 
1.2. Price Regulation 
At the very beginning the NEB set that price was supposed to be "just and 
reasonable". ln 1967 the NEB provides a more precise definition of this price. It must cover 
production costs, exceed domestic prices and be comparable to the least cost alternative fuel 
in the US. In 1976 the concept of substitution value is advanced. The price of Canadian gas 
export is related to the cost of oil import. During the 70's, the NEB can increase border prices 
without diminishing export volumes as a result of chronic excess demand on the US gas 
market. 
The appearance of the "gas bubble" in the US, as well as the second oil shock and 
his related border price increase, lead to a sharp decline of demand for import gas. Since 1983 
Canada has introduced a special Volume-Related lncentice Price applicable to 50 % of annual 
licenced volume. This is the beginning of a more market-oriented policy. Now, prices are 
more and more set through direct negociation between buyers and sellers. 
Table 2. US Domestic Prices (1) and Border Prices (2) · $/Mcf 
Year (1) (2) Year (1) (2) 
1960 0.14 0.21 1977 0.79 1.99 
1978 0.91 2.19 
1965 0.16 0.26 1979 1.18 2.61 
1980 1.59 4.33 
1970 0.17 0.27 1981 1.98 4.85 
1971 0.18 0.28 1982 2.46 4.98 
1972 0.19 0.31 1983 2.59 4.51 
1973 0.22 0.35 1984 2.66 4.04 
1974 0.30 0.55 1985 · 2.51 3.17 
1975 0.45 1.21 1986 1.94 2.42 
1976 0.58 1.73 1987 1.71 2.12 
Source: C.l' A. Swtistical Handbook and E.IA. 
2. Modeling Canadian Natural Gas Exports 
The goal of our modelismion is to explain Canadian gas export to the US by 
taking into account : 
· Regulation of the Canadian authorities 
. Particular situation of the US gas market. 
The brief above analysis of the market gives us some insight about constraints on suppl y and 
demand. 
During the 70's the supply of export is constrained by the volume authorized by 
rhe Canadian regulation. Of course this constraint hns never been reached. In our model we 
consider that the constraint is effective if expons exceed 95 % of authorized volume. This 
because of the friction prevailing on the market. 
The situation bas completly reversed during the first years of the 80's as a result 
of the gas bubble in the US market and the relatively high prices of exported natural gas. 
The supply and demand equations are : 
Where: 
St"' Cnnadian supply of export at time t 
Dt"' US demand of import 
Pet -~ price of the exported gas 
Pet = gas price in Canada 
Put = gas price in OS 
Rest= amount of natural gas reserves in Canada 
Const = natural gas consumption in US. 
Supply is a fonction of relative prices and reserves. Producers will offer more 
natural gas to the export market if exported gas price is high relative to domestic price. 
Demand is a fonction of relative prices and US gas consumption. American 
pipelines compare border gas price to the domestic one in order to choose the amoum they 
are willing to buy. 
Ali variables are in logarithmic form for the period from 1960 to 1987. 
2.1 OLS estimation 
If we ignore the constraint on suppl y and demand, coefficients can be estimated 
by OLS with the following results : 
Table 3. OLS Estimation 
Variables 
Supply Curve : 
For demand : 
Constant 
LPe/Pc 
LRes-1 
Constant 
LPe/Pu 
LCons 
Coefficients 
-0.4334 
0.4738 
1.1249 
-1.9051 
-0.1236 
2.9310 
t ratios 
0.4127 
1.3713 
8.7971 
2.1677 
0.5594 
9.1417 
For the supply curve as well as for the one of demand, price elasticities, as 
indicared by t-test, have no explanatory power. Obviously this is a consequence of the 
misspecification of the mode!.. To use OLS, we need to suppose thatequilibrium prevails over 
the overall estimation period. ln fact, as previously mentionned, supply and demand are 
constrained. 
2.2 Tobit Estimation 
If we now take into account the volume limitation due to Canadian regulation, 
model specification became more realistic. A proper way to perform is by using a TOBIT 
fonnulation (cf. MADDALA, 1983). 
with: 
Y* 1 = "latent" supply or demand 
Xt = explanatory variables 
LIM1 = amount of authorized exportable natural gas 
In this case the quantity actually exchanged on the market is the minimum of the "potential" 
supply or demand and the authorized volume of transaction. The observed export volumes 
Table 5. Disequilibrium Model Estimation 
Variables Coefficients t ratios 
Supply Curve : 
Constant 1.4479 8.2624 
LPe/Pc 1.0240 6.5321 
LRes"l 1.1197 14.4263 
Demand Curve ; 
Constant -6.2753 14.6388 
LPe/Pu -0.9520 4.4260 
LCons 4.7068 26.7350 
One of the outstanding result of the disequilibrium mode! is the possibility to 
obtain a regime classification for each year. 
One may compute probabilities of each observation to be a supply or a demand 
point (see KIEFER, 1980). lkre we have : 
--
Table 6. Probabilites of Various Regimes 
Year Prob(S1<D1) Year Prob(S1<D1) 
1960 0.0005 1975 0.5586 
1961 0.0129 1976 0.6104 
1962 0.5958 1977 0.6542 
1963 0.6529 1978 0.6275 
1964 0.6552 1979 0.6967 
1965 0.4815 1980 0.1318 
1966 0.4850 1981 0,0277 
1967 0.7788 1982 0.0514 
1968 0.8551 1983 0.0668 
1969 0.9484 1984 0.3770 
1970 0.9720 1985 0.6936 
1971 0.9747 1986 0.4611 
1972 0.9650 1987 0.6009 
1973 0.9590 
1974 0.8926 
If Prob(St<D1) is bigger chan 1/2 then the observation t is on the suppl y fonction, 
don't represent euch year the reul supply and demand behavior. Maximum likelihood 
estimation of such a mode! gives : 
Table 4. Tobit Estimation 
Variables 
Supply Curve : 
Demand Curve : 
Constant 
LPe/Pc 
LRes-1 
Constant 
LPe/Pu 
LCons 
Coefficients 
0.0459 
0.9323 
1.2599 
-4.5692 
·0.2882 
3.9407 
t ratios 
0.0288 
1.7147 
6.4313 
3.8722 
1.0290 
8.8994 
Despite a small improvement of magnitude and statistical significance of 
coefficients, global results remain weak. 
2.3 Disequilîbrium estimation 
In the previous section we suppose that there w:1s a constraint on supply and 
demand only if the quantity actually transacted is limited by the authorized volume. lt doesn't 
take into account the fact that prices are strongly regulated and that demand is not necessurily 
equal to supply. The disequilibrium mode! does (cf. FAIR & JAFFEE, 1972). To obtain this 
mode! we just need to add (5) to equations (]) and (2) 
Natural gas actually exchanged on the market is the minimum of demand for import and 
suppl y for export. If D1 is greater than S1 then the observed export level (XPORT) is on the 
supply fonction, else the observed quantity is on the demand fonction. It is the formalisation 
of the idea that one cannot be obliged to sell or to buy more that he wants to. The likelihood 
fonction of this mode! is given by MADDALA and NELSON (1974). The maximum 
likelihood estimation of this new mode! is as follows : 
else it is a demand point. 
The classification between suppl y and demand is a confümation of the insight we 
got at the end of our brief analysis of the market (cf. 1.1 and 1.2). From 1960 to 1969 
transacted quantities are altematively demand or snpply points. Between 1970 and 1979 all 
dates are supply points. This a consequence of the shortage era in the US domestic gas 
market. Furtherrnore Canadian supply, limited by quotas and price regulation, is smaller than 
US demand for import. In 1980, with the appearance of the "gas bubble" concurrently to 
Canadian prices increase, the demand becomes smaller than supply until 1986. It is very 
interesting to note that, even without any information on sample separation between supply 
and demand points, the disequilibrium mode! is able to properly retrieve the sequence of the 
various states of the export gus market. 
Coefficients associated with independent variables in the disequilibrium mode! 
seems to be more reasonable than those of the OLS estimation. The TOBIT estimates are 
intem1ediate. With our las! mode!, strong improvements in statistical tests are observed. 
Moreover, the rather high price clasticity of the US demand is shown when most elasticities 
are strongly underestimated by OLS. 
3. Concluding remarks 
The disappearance of fonner constraints leads to new market structures. However, 
it remains important to be able to keep track of the past. By relaxing fom1er constraints, in the 
view of new commercial practice between the two panners, and taking into account current 
technical potential, impact of deregulation can be efficiently quantified. 
The disequilibrium mode! provides good results for the Canadian export gas 
market. Obviously, one could introduce additional factors to improve its explanatory power. 
However, it allows to estimate the coefficients of equations properly describing behaviors 
which have a constrained expression on the market. lt is tremendously important to highlight 
reasonable values for those coefficients in order to forecast the effects of current deregulation. 
A key conclusion is that demand for Canadian exports is strongly price-responsive. With the 
new upward movement of natural gas consumption in the US since 1986 and the improved 
price competitivity of Canadian gas, we might expect a rather large growth of the Canadian 
gas export. 
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